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7 
ASSESSING METACOGNITION: 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
BUROS SYMPOSIUM 
Gregory Schraw 
The University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
This chapter attempts to consolidate the diverse opinions and 
conclusions included in the previous six chapters of this volume. I 
have found it easiest to do so in three sections. Section 1 provides a 
summary the book's main themes. These themes pertain to the need 
for a more comprehensive theory of metacognition, the disparity 
between metacognitive theory and measurement, methodological 
questions about the measurement of metacognitive processes, con-
cerns about poor instrumentation, the generality of the metacognition 
construct, and issues pertaining to educational practice. Section 2 
raises concerns central to the measurement community in general. 
These concerns include questions about the reliability and validity of 
assessment techniques and paper-and-pencil measures. Another 
concern is the need for dependable performance assessment of 
metacognitive skills among younger and older students. Section 3 
makes a number of suggestions for future research and measurement 
practice based on current theory. A number of educational implica-
tions are discussed as well. 
Six Emergent Themes 
Most researchers studying metacognition agree that it is impor-
tant to study, but difficult to measure. The chapters included in this 
volume provide a variety of strategies to bridge the gap between 
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metacognitive theory and measurement practice. I believe there are 
six discernable themes that emerge from these chapters that, collec-
tively, point the field in a sensible direction for further research and 
discussion. 
Theme 1: The need for a comprehensive, unified theory of metacognition. 
Throughout this volume, there are repeated references to two compat-
ible, yet theoretically distinct, theories of metacognition associated 
with the work of John Flavell (1987) and Ann Brown (1987). Most 
experts, including those represented in this volume, view this as a 
serious problem because it prevents researchers from agreeing upon 
basic metacognitive processes and terminology for those processes. The 
terminology problem is especially important because many researchers 
describe the same basic processes using somewhat different terms. 
However, all the contributors to this volume, as well as other 
theorists not included (Chi, 1987; Garner, 1987, 1994; Nelson & Narens, 
1994; Metcalfe, 1994a), agree on the primacy of three overarching 
processes I refer to as regulatory control, performance monitoring, and 
task monitoring. The former refers to a variety of self-regulatory 
processes used to actively, and often intentionally, control cognitive 
activity. Many of these activities have been described in detail in 
related volumes on self-regulated performance (Schunk & 
Zimmerman, 1994; Zimmerman & Schunk, 1989) and reading 
(Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995; Pressley, Harris, & Guthrie, 1992). 
Performance monitoring refers to monitoring ongoing compre-
hension via either self-report or various subjective measures (see 
Schraw, Wise, & Roos, this volume). Task monitoring refers to 
assessing the demands of the task at hand, especially its difficulty 
relative to one's own skills and knowledge (see Borkowski, Chan, 
& Muthukrishna, this volume). 
A great deal of discussion centers around these processes either 
directly or indirectly. Most chapter authors believe the three processes 
are related in a reciprocal, interactive fashion, forming a triarchic set of 
basic metacognitive processes (Pintrich, Wolters, & Baxter, this volume). 
There are several explicit mentions of the relationship between control 
and performance monitoring, a relationship Schraw et al. (this vol-
ume) refer to as a regulatory loop. Borkowski et al. (this volume) also 
address the crucial relationship between task monitoring and conh'ol, 
especially among younger students and older students who find aca-
demic work quite difficult (Borkowski & Thorpe, 1994). 
A closely related problem is the fuzzy boundary that separates 
overlapping constructs such as metacognition, executive processes, 
and self-regulation (Pintrich et al., this volume; Zimmerman, 1994). 
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Although little is said about this issue directly, there is some discus-
sion regarding the relationship between metacognition and motiva-
tional variables. These authors generally agree that motivation is an 
important contributor to metacognition, although it is less clear whether 
it is part of metacognition per se (see Garcia & Pintrich, 1994 and 
Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider, 1987 for related discussions). 
Theme 2: There is a large discrepancy between metacognitive theory 
and measurement practice. Chapter authors unanimously agreed that 
metacognition is an important theoretical construct that warrants 
serious attention. They also agreed that measurement aspects of 
metacognition typically are included as an afterthought. Most re-
searchers are interested in measuring metacognition only as far as 
those measurements can be used to evaluate metacognitive theory or 
improve instructional practice. This perspective limits focus on the 
integrity of the measurement process apart from how it impacts 
metacognitive theory. 
Reducing the gap between metacognitive theory and measure-
ment practice depends in part on the success of establishing a compre-
hensive theory of metacognition that researchers can use as a common 
referent point (see Theme 1). It also depends on researchers' willing-
ness to become conversant with contemporary measurement theory 
and to value the integrity of one's measurement instruments as much 
as one's metacognitive theory. This is a tall order at the present, given 
that many researchers interested in metacognition have limited train-
ing in psychometric theory, little interest per se in measurement, and 
tend to view measurement as an unglamorous means to a more 
impressive theoretical end. 
Theme 3: There is considerable debate regarding the relative pros and 
cons of different assessment methodologies. As in any contemporary 
debate on research, this volume present differing views regarding the 
utility of qualitative and quantitative methods. Pressley (this volume) 
presents a careful argument for the increased use of qualitative 
methods such as grounded theory approaches Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
According to Pressley (this volume), researchers have privileged 
access to the thoughts and strategies used by individuals as they 
perform a task or reflect on their performance. 
Others were less positive about qualitative approaches, however 
voicing traditional concerns summarized in Ericsson and Simon (1993) 
and Pressley and Afflerbach (1995). These include the potentially 
intrusive nature of interviews, the possibility that individuals do not 
have privileged access to their own cognitive processes, and the 
possibility that individuals will provide biased reports of their activi-
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ties. Nevertheless, all of the contributors to this volume agreed that 
both traditions have strengths and weaknesses, and do not guarantee 
informative or accurate assessment. More importantly, there was 
strong agreement that any method is superior to no method at all! 
The most reasonable strategy at this point is to recognize the problem, 
then turn our attention to the daunting task of unifying metacognitive 
theory and constructing reliable and valid methods for evaluating 
that theory. 
Another methodological subtheme concerned what several au-
thors referred to as grain size; that is, the specificity of the task that is 
being assessed (Howard-Rose & Winne, 1993; Pintrich et al., this 
volume). Pressley (this volume), for example, described ongoing 
research of an extremely broad grain size-no less than an exhaustive 
taxonomy of strategies used during highly constructive reading. 
Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) reported over 150 separate strategies. 
Tobias and Everson (this volume) reported studies of much smaller 
grain size; that is, the accuracy of specific monitoring judgments. The 
process model described by Borkowski et al. (this volume) necessi-
tated a number of assessments, each of differing grain sizes. 
The issue of grain size is important for two reasons. One is that 
bigger grains become increasingly dependent on longitudinal, quali-
tative methods, although it is possible to use sophisticated quantita-
tive methods such as structural equation modelling as well. In 
contrast, very small grains seem easier to study with traditional 
quantitative methods such as reaction and choice selection times, 
recognition and recall measures, or calibrated accuracy judgments. 
One potential drawback, however, is that small-grain processes may 
be so automatic, individuals may no longer have privileged access to 
performance, precluding the use of introspective measures. 
Grain size also affects the degree to which measurements provide 
a useful test of meta cognitive theory or educational interventions. For 
example, although studying the acquisition of a specific strategy is 
crucial (see Borkowski et al., this volume), such information would 
not be sufficient to assess the validity of the process models described 
by Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) or Borkowski et al. (this volume). 
A third methodological subtheme concerned what kind of 
metacognitive processes individuals choose to study. The general 
consensus was that small-grain processes (e.g., monitoring strategies) 
vary among different groups and ages, and that one model of 
metacognition may not apply to all individuals. On the other hand, 
studying monitoring processes in experts and novices may lead to 
different results (Glaser & Chi, 1988; Glenberg & Epstein, 1987). The 
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current volume does not offer a resolution to this paradox. I believe 
that researchers will have to make a greater effort to construct a 
comprehensive developmental model of metacognition as opposed to 
a purely descriptive account of what the average college sophomore 
does. Clearly, models are needed in which expert and novice perfor-
mance can be reconciled. 
At this point, there continue to be important differences of opin-
ion regarding how to measure metacognition. This issue must be 
resolved before substantial progress can be made in the field. Specifi-
cally, researchers must at least agree on what constitutes necessary 
and sufficient evidence for assessing the validity of metacognitive 
constructs, even if researchers continue to disagree about the methods 
they use to collect evidence. Pintrich, Wolters, and Baxter (this 
volume) make a number of important suggestions in this regard 
based on the work of Messick (1989). 
Theme 4: Most available instruments that measure metacognition have 
unknown psychometric properties. Both Pintrich et al. (this volume) and 
Baker and Cerro (this volume) suggested that most measures of 
metacognition can be characterized by two salient features: (a) they were 
constructed for use within a specific study and (b) there is little or no 
normative information about them even within the population for 
which they were designed. There are two measurement-related conse-
quences. One is tllat the dimensionality of the insh'uments (i.e., what 
psychomeh'icians would refer to as an instrument's factor structure) is 
unknown. This prevents researchers from identifying the number and 
type of psychological constructs the instrument presumably measures. 
Second, there often is no information regarding how the hypothesized 
construct is related to other relevant performance outcomes. 
There are several instruments that prove exceptions to this rule. 
One is the Learning and Study Strategies Inventory (LASSI) devel-
oped by Weinstein, Zimmerman, and Palmer (1988), which reports 10 
separate subscales, including attitude, motivation, anxiety, test strat-
egies, and self-testing. Although the LASSI has acceptable internal 
consistency measures for each scale (i.e., _ = .70 to .80), and correlates 
with measures of cognitive performance, it is unclear whether it 
measures meta cognition per se, or cognitive skills such as study 
strategies that are regulated with the help of metacognitive knowl-
edge. Another instrument is the Motivated Strategies for Learning 
Questionnaire (MSLQ) (Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990; Pintrich, Smith, 
Garcia, & McKeachie, 1993), which measures both motivational and 
strategy subscales. A third scale is the Metacognitive Assessment 
Inventory (MAl) (Schraw & Dennison, 1994), which includes know l-
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edge of cognition and regulation of cognition subscales. Although the 
MAl has extremely high reliability, its relationship to other cognitive 
measures remains to be investigated. 
As this list indicates, all of these instruments have been developed 
within the last decade, and most are fewer than five years old. Initial 
results seem promising, and there is complete agreement that all of 
these instruments represent positive steps in the assessment of basic 
metacognitive knowledge. However, as Pressley and Afflerbach 
(1995) point out, paper-and-pencil inventories are no substitute for 
more in-depth analyses of metacognitive knowledge. Second, inven-
tories alone seem incapable of capturing the complex dynamics of 
metacognitive regulation. Third, all of these instruments are intended 
for use with adolescents and adults; thus, instrumentation is needed 
for younger learners. 
Theme 5: There is uncertainty (and discomfort) regarding the domain-
generality of metacognition. The degree to which metacognition consti-
tutes a domain-general phenomenon remains an important question. 
The basic issue is this: If metacognition is really a function of exper-
tise, and therefore is domain-specific, can it be measured at all using 
a domain-general instrument such as the LASSI, MSLQ, or MAl? An 
equally pressing problem is how to test whether metacognition is a 
domain-general phenomenon? Several studies have addressed this 
question either directly or indirectly. Glenberg and Epstein (1987), for 
instance, found a negative relationship between expertise and moni-
toring. Music experts monitored more poorly than physics experts on 
a test of music principles whereas the reverse was true on a physics 
test! Morris (1990) found that domain knowledge was unrelated to 
monitoring proficiency even though it was related to one's ability to 
answer questions effectively in that domain. However, Maki and 
Serra (1992) found that monitoring improved as individuals acquired 
more information from the to-be-Iearned materials. These studies 
provided indirect, as well as conflicting, evidence about the domain-
specific nature of metacognitive knowledge and regulation. 
A more direct study was conducted by Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, 
and Roedel (1995). In the first of two experiments, individuals 
completed eight multiple-choice tests that varied with respect to 
content domain, overall difficulty, number of items, inferential diffi-
culty, and number of distractors. Despite the heterogeneity of these 
tests, confidence judgments were correlated in the neighborhood of r 
= .50 among all tests even when performance was controlled statisti-
cally. Monitoring accuracy and discrimination scores (i.e., the ability 
to discriminate between correct and incorrect answers) were also 
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correlated. However, in Experiment 2, where all five tests were 
matched on length, difficulty, and test-item format, monitoring accu-
racy and discrimination scores were correlated even when perfor-
mance was controlled. Schraw et al. (1995) concluded that monitoring 
accuracy and discrimination were attributable to two processes that 
included domain-specific expertise and knowledge that supports 
performance, and domain-general regulatory strategies such as self-
checking that supports self-regulation. 
Of course, all of the studies described in this section investigated 
metacognitive processes of limited grain size (i.e., comprehension 
monitoring). Thus, even though there is evidence that comprehen-
sion monitoring relies in part on domain-general metacognitive knowl-
edge, it does not follow that other metacognitive processes (e.g., 
planning, and allocation of cognitive resources) are domain-general. 
The theoretical and educational implications of future research in 
this area are crucial in my opinion. One implication of data consistent 
with the domain-general view is that educators may feel more confi-
dent teaching domain-general metacognitive skills, rather than skills 
that are encapsulated within specific domains such as mathematics 
and reading (see Fodor, 1983; Gardner, 1983; and Hirschfeld & Gelman, 
1994, for opposing views). A second implication is that researchers 
must inquire about the development of domain-general skills. One 
intriguing explanation has been proposed by Karmiloff-Srnith (1992) 
who hypothesized that domain-specific skills and knowledge are 
merged over time across domains to create domain-general knowl-
edge. Understanding the underlying cognitive mechanisms that 
enable this development is a worthy topic in and of itself. 
Theme 6: Difficulty relating metacognitive theory to educational prac-
tice. One often heard complaint is that there are too few proven 
methods for improving metacognition among children and adoles-
cents. Baker and Cerro (this volume) point to a number of successes, 
including Palincsar and Brown (1984), Paris and colleagues (Cross & 
Paris, 1988; Jacobs & Paris, 1987), and Pressley and colleagues (Brown 
& Pressley, 1994; Pressley, Harris, & Marks, 1992). Nevertheless, 
Baker and Cerro also are outspoken about theorists' willingness to 
make snap educational recommendations without any evidence to 
support their claims. In fact, most training studies have reported 
modest, yet lasting, gains only after intensive instruction lasting from 6 
weeks to 6 months (Delclos & Harrington, 1991; King, 1991, 1992). 
Another major problem is the almost complete lack of standard-
ized assessment guidelines for use in the classroom or in research 
settings, especially when evaluating younger learners. One notable 
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study in tills regard was Swanson (1990), who found that metacognitive 
knowledge among fifth and sixth graders facilitated problem solving. 
Swanson also suggested that metacognitive regulation may develop 
independent of skills traditionally measured on aptitude tests, al-
though tills controversial claim requires additional research. To 
assess metacognition, Swanson administered a 20-question verbal 
interview, tapping student's knowledge about self-regulation. 
Swanson also provided extensive documentation for scoring the 
interview, although with the exception of Corkill and Koshida (1993), 
others have not capitalized on these guidelines. 
SUMMARY 
The six themes related to the theory and practice of metacognition 
provide an ambitious agenda for future theory development, re-
search, and educational practice. It seems clear that a new agenda is 
in order. Indeed, it is conceivable that the construct of metacognition 
may lose its appeal to practitioners, and its theoretical relevance, if 
researchers do not provide a much greater degree of psychometric 
rigor during the next decade. There are several salient issues facing 
researchers. One is to construct a comprehensive theory that in-
cludes well-specified subcomponents. A second is to agree on what 
kinds of evidence are necessary to validate this theory. A third is to 
construct standardized procedures using qualitative and quantita-
tive methods to assess metacognitive competencies. A fourth is to 
design and test interventions to improve or remediate important 
meta cognitive competencies. A fifth is to propose standards by 
willch these interventions can be evaluated. 
Thoughts from the Measurement Community 
Not everyone is excited by terms like metacognition and self-
regulation. As recently as the mid-1980s, many people felt that 
metacognition was too broad and elusive to be studied effectively. 
One common complaint, and the driving force behind the sympo-
sium, is that some theorists interested in metacognition have neither 
the training or inclination to establish sound psychometric underpin-
nings to measures of the construct. 
In tills spirit, there are several cautions that one might expect to 
hear from testing and measurement experts. Although these cautions 
parallel the six themes described above, they provide a view of the 
problem from a somewhat different perspective. 
Caution 1: The field needs a plan for comprehensive assessment of the 
construct. Test authors would quickly point to the testing industry to 
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make their case. Aptitude tests, for example, come in virtually every 
size and shape imaginable. These tests typically provide reliability and 
validity norms, and endeavor to meet all the standard evaluative criteria 
proposed by measurement theorists such as the Standards for Educational 
and Psychological Testing (AREA, APA, & NCME, 1985). Notwith-
standing the continuing debate about the validity of aptitude tests, and 
the role that aptitude plays in learning (see Jensen, 1992, and Sternberg, 
1986, for different views), modern testing as we know it would not be 
possible without an overarching plan for translating aptitude theory 
into instruments that can be evaluated with exacting care. 
Caution 2: Generate and test models. Researchers have failed for the 
most part to translate metacognitive theory into testable models. In 
this view, a theory provides a method for systematically organizing a 
body of knowledge that explains a particular set of phenomena 
(Byrnes, 1992; Kuhn, 1989; Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Every theory 
has at least two distinguishable parts; a formal aspect (i.e., postulates 
about how a phenomenon occurs) and an empirical aspect (Le., a test of 
those postulates, usually in the form of data or mathematical proofs). 
A model provides a formal description of a theory by specifying the 
relationships among its most important postulates. These descrip-
tions often take the form of a diagram, flow chart, or summary table. 
Models are convenient ways to operationalize a theory and enable 
researchers to test one part of the theory at a time. Models are useful 
in that a theory can be tested and modified without discarding the 
entire model. 
Both Flavell (1987) and Brown (1987) proposed descriptive theo-
ries of metacognition that, although overlapping, remain somewhat 
independent of one another. Surprisingly, very few researchers have 
attempted to translate these theories into operational models that 
enable researchers to investigate systematically the relationships among 
model components. Two important exceptions are the models pro-
posed by Nelson and Narens (1990, 1994) and Borkowski and col-
leagues (Borkowski & Muthukrishna, 1992; Borkowski & Thorpe, 
1994; Borkowski et al., this volume). These models enable researchers 
to make explicit predictions about the relationships among control 
and monitoring processes, one's extant knowledge base, and motiva-
tional factors that affect self-regulation. 
Process models clearly play an important role in theory testing. 
Models specify particular relationships that can be tested explicitly. 
Of equal importance, models focus our attention on the role that 
instrumentation and measurement play in theory testing. The advent 
and continued growth of structural equation modeling, for example, 
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has ushered in a new era in the measurement of salient constructs in 
cognitive psychology. Such models require researchers to test not 
only the structural aspects of the model (i.e., relationships among 
model components predicted by theory), but measurement aspects as 
well (Bollen, 1989). 
Caution 3: Construct and evaluate instruments that assess specific 
components of the model. Three questions seem especially germane to 
this caution. These include: (a) What is the construct of interest? (b) 
Do appropriate measures exist to measure it? and (c) Does the 
measurement process change the construct? Each of these questions 
is considered briefly. 
What is the construct? Broad constructs are difficult to measure, 
making it unlikely that there will ever be a single measure of 
metacognition (see Pintrich et al., this volume; Schraw, 1995). An 
alternative approach would be to partition the metacognition con-
struct into smaller components, then hypothesize about the relation-
ships among subcomponents, although others may disagree with this 
strategy (Linn, 1991). Constructing a detailed structural model that 
specifies individual components and their interrelationships is an 
essential precursor to the validation process. 
Do appropriate measures exist? Once potentially measurable sub-
components have been defined, researchers must select behavioral 
and self-report indices that measure these components. Indices of 
metacognitive activity should be evaluated in an ongoing manner 
using a variety of approaches (see Crocker & Algina, 1986, chapter 4, 
for a summary of this process). Potential measures need to be 
evaluated with respect to reliability, validity, and utility, or their 
qualitative counterparts such as credibility and authenticity (Creswell, 
1994; Merriam, 1988; Miles & Huberman, 1984). 
Two aspects of reliability are essential. One concerns the internal 
consistency of an instrument. Measures such as coefficient alpha 
provide easy-to-compute indices of internal consistency and are avail-
able for a variety of measures of meta cognitive knowledge and 
performance (Pintrich et al., 1993; Schraw & Dennison,1994; Weinstein 
et al., 1988). However, when used in isolation, coefficient alpha is 
insufficient. A second aspect of reliability is consistency over time. 
Currently, there is little available information regarding test-retest 
reliability on commonly used measures of self-regulation and 
metacognition. 
Multiple aspects of validity are crucial to the effective use and 
interpretation of scores from an instrument or experimental results. 
In their chapter, Pintrich et al. (this volume) addressed the question of 
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validity using Messick's (1989) five-component framework. In this 
view, all questions of validity are essentially questions related to 
construct validity (Le., the degree to which inferences about a score 
accurately represent an observable or unobservable phenomenon of 
interest). Given that Messick views each of these five components as 
interrelated, threats to any component necessarily affect all others. 
A similar argument can be made for the credibility of qualitative 
methods. Whether researchers use terms such as utility or confirmability 
is beside the point; rather, they must demonstrate that they have 
explained a hypothetical construct (or phenomenon) in an accurate, 
replicable way. Researchers with a predilection for either qualitative 
or quantitative methods should conduct carefully planned validation 
studies to assure their methods accurately describe the phenomenon 
of interest. In particular, there is a tremendous need for studies 
evaluating the convergent and divergent validity of scores from 
multiple measures, preferably using multiple methodologies, to ex-
plain metacognitive phenomena. Point 3 made by Pintrich et al. (this 
volume), in which they recommended the use of a multitrait, 
multimethod approach to construct validation, emphasized this con-
cern directly. 
Does the measurement process change the construct? Researchers 
must ask themselves to what extent their measures of metacognition 
affect the deployment of metacognitive knowledge and regulatory 
skills. Although there are a variety of potential measurement con-
founds, several that I consider to be especially serious are discussed 
below (see Baker & Cerro, this volume). The first is that self-report 
inventories (e.g., Schraw & Dennison, 1994) may elicit socially desir-
able responses. One way to safeguard against instrument bias is to 
conduct convergent and divergent validity studies. Unfortunately, 
few studies of this kind have been reported. 
A second potential problem is that think-aloud studies may 
affect the measurement of metacognitive processes by competing for 
limited resources that are necessary for task performance. One option 
is to use retrospective self-reports; however, verbal report theorists 
generally view retrospective reports as less reliable than concurrent self-
reports. Competition for limited resources also affects many quantita-
tive studies, but especially those using on-line confidence judgments of 
performance. One alternative is to use unobh'usive measures such as 
computerized testing procedures (Schraw et al., this volume). 
A third problem is that structured interviews may provide infor-
mation to individuals that they would not report on their own, 
thereby masking their true metacognitive knowledge. One option is 
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to ask iniormants to respond in writing, although this leads to other 
problems such as competition for limited resources. 
A fourth problem, and the most serious in my opinion, is that 
individuals may differ in terms of their ability to explain or estimate 
their metacognitive knowledge either verbally or in writing. For 
example, experts may have a richer vocabulary for describing their 
mental processes, even though novices engage in similar processes. 
In essence, this problem is due to aptitude by treatment interactions, 
and must be considered carefully when researchers evaluate potential 
threats to the validity of their findings. 
Caution 4: Use diverse assessment methods. Pintrich et al. (this 
volume) captured the main theme of the Buros Symposium when 
they concluded there is no one-size-fits-all measure of metacognition. 
Indeed, if we accept the premise that there are two or more distinct 
metacognitive processes (e.g., control and monitoring), it seems rea-
sonable to conclude that there must be different measures of these 
processes. Equally reasonable is the assumption that each identifiable 
metacognitive process can be measured using different instruments 
and methodologies (see Borkowski et al., this volume). 
Perhaps the best advice one could give researchers interested in 
metacognition is to adopt a multitrait, multimethod (MTMM) model 
of assessment along the lines first proposed by Campbell and Fiske 
(1959), and elaborated upon by Cook and Campbell (1979). The 
MTMM approach emphasizes the collection of multiple measures of 
a phenomenon using multiple, preferably diverse, methodologies. In 
the context of validating metacognitive theory, this means using 
objective self-reports (Pintrich et al., this volume), subjective self-
reports such as concurrent verbal reports (Pressley, this volume), 
subjective assessments of one's thinking or performance such as 
calibration judgments (Tobias & Everson, this volume), and unobtru-
sive measures such as item selection times using computer-based 
testing (Schraw et al., this volume) . Other measurement approaches 
are needed as well, such as neurophysiological correlates of 
meta cognition (Metcalfe, 1994b). 
Summary 
The four cautions outlined above summarize basic measurement 
concerns for any research agenda. They have special importance for 
the domain of metacognitive research given the paucity of systematic 
validation studies. Foremost, the field needs a systematic and com-
prehensive assessment agenda, lest it lose its credibility among psy-
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chologists and educators in general, and measurement experts in 
particular. A major part of this agenda should include the develop-
ment of a testable model of metacognition. Work in this direction was 
described by Borkowski et al. (this volume). Second, working models 
must be tested and refined in an ongoing basis. Earlier stages of this 
research will undoubtedly focus on specific components of 
metacognition, whereas the later stages may test multicomponent 
models using procedures such as structural equation modeling; that 
is, the grain size of these studies would be expected to change over 
time. Third, a variety of measures should be used to assess each 
separate component, as well as the entire model. Last, adopting a 
multitrait, multimethod approach to model testing may enhance the 
effectiveness of this research. 
An Agenda for Future Research 
There are many ways that the assessment of metacognition can be 
improved in the future, but it is not an easy task, and it cam10t be done 
without the help of colleagues in different fields of study. This section 
makes seven suggestions for future research and practice based on the 
cautions described above. I have rank ordered these suggestions in a 
way that might surprise some readers. Regardless of their ordering, 
all are essential to the advancement of the field, and should be taken 
seriously. 
Suggestion 1: Researchers interested in metacognition must collaborate 
with measurement and instructional design experts. Most of the authors 
included in this volume would acknowledge their lack of technical 
measurement expertise. Most of them, and most researchers working 
in the area of metacognition, are not keenly interested in measure-
ment issues per se. Many, including myself, do not have a strong 
interest in the design of instructional interventions. Yet it is clear to 
me that failing to involve measurement and instructional design 
experts may be disastrous to the field. I believe we are at an impasse 
that cannot be overcome without the skills and knowledge of experts 
who do not share our vested interest in the construct of metacognition. 
On a brighter note, let me focus on some of the potential advan-
tages of cross-disciplinary collaborations. One is that experts at 
solving measurement problems may add a tremendous amount of 
richness to existing theory. A second is that measurement and 
instructional design experts may provide innovative ways to assess 
metacognition, both with respect to objective paper-and-pencil mea-
sures, as well as performance-based assessments. A third is that 
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instructional design experts have much to offer by way of translating 
metacognitive theory into instructional practice. The same may be 
said regarding how to evaluate formative and summative instruc-
tional outcomes. 
Suggestion 2: Agree on a unified theoretical framework. It bears 
repeating that the field is perceived by some outsiders as too theoreti-
cally disparate. It is unlikely that substantially more progress will be 
made until researchers agree on what it is they are looking for. My 
personal preferences are for a three-component model of metacognition 
that emphasizes the role of regulatory control, performance monitor-
ing, and task-monitoring processes. Such a model is already consis-
tent with much of the theorizing being done in meta cognition and 
self-regulation (Baker, 1989; Borkowski et al., this volume; Garner, 
1987; Garner & Alexander, 1989; Jacobs & Paris, 1987; Nelson & 
Narens, 1994; Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990; Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995; 
Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Even earlier theories such as those 
proposed by Brown (1987) and Flavell (1987) that postulate two main 
components, are highly consistent with the three-component view. 
It is my view that the most important issue separating existing 
accounts of metacognition is terminological differences, not assump-
tions about basic metacognitive processes. In a way, it is as if the field 
has agreed on what kind of pizza it wants to eat, but still can't decide 
how to slice the pieces! I believe we are much closer to a comprehen-
sive theory of metacognition than most casual observers would give 
us credit for. Perhaps our greatest challenge is to recognize the 
perception of disarray from outside the field and to resolve it! 
Another theory-related suggestion is to focus on measuring the 
practical and statistical relationships among the three main compo-
nents described above. Recent work by Nelson and Narens (1990, 
1994) and Koriat (1993, 1994) have raised extremely important ques-
tions about the relationship between monitoring and control. The 
importance of this relationship, as well as ways to test it, were echoed 
by Schraw et al. (this volume). Borkowski et al. (this volume) also 
emphasized the relationship between performance and task monitoring. 
Suggestion 3: Identify suitable outcome measures that can be used as 
criteria to evaluate metacognitive behaviors. Most of the work done in the 
field of metacognition has been devoted to generating theory. A 
sizable amount of work also has been done on testing a narrow band 
of metacognitive processes, but especially comprehension monitoring 
(See Baker, 1989; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990; and Schraw & Moshman, 
1995, for reviews). Some work, but not a great deal, has been done on 
instructional improvement (Brown & Pressley, 1994; Jacobs & Paris, 
7. ASSESSING METACOGNITION 311 
1987; King, 1991; Brown & Palincsar, 1989). Yet virtually no attention 
has been paid to identifying suitable outcome measures of 
metacognition, other than as they apply to testing components of 
metacognitive theories, or evaluating the efficacy of instructional 
interventions. 
Of particular concern are measures with a high degree of ecologi-
cal validity, including performance-based measures that capture mid-
range (e.g., 3 months) and long-term (e.g., 6 months or more) 
development of metacognition. There are not any suitable methods in 
this regard at the present time, and unfortunately, few researchers 
seem to have considered this problem (see Baker & Cerro, this 
volume, and Garner, 1987, for further discussion). 
Outcome measures should be identified that meet a variety of 
needs. One especially important need is to parallel measures of 
metacognition that are suitable for children and adults. Without such 
measures, comparisons among age groups at a single time are com-
promised, as are across-time comparisons within the same group. A 
second need is to identify measures that are suitable for field settings. 
Many studies rely on either checklists or overt behavioral measures. 
Lacking is a method for identifying multiple levels of metacognitive 
activity via self-report. A third need is to construct specific versus 
broad measures of metacognition. Most shldies focus on monitoring 
judgments made prior to or after completing a test item. Although 
monitoring reflects an important component of metacognition, it fails 
to provide information about strategies for planning, debugging, or 
evaluating. 
Another important question to ask about these measures is the 
degree to which they intrude on metacognitive processes. Asking 
individuals to think-aloud as they perform a task, for example, may 
interfere with that task by consuming limited resources, or it may 
facilitate metacognitive behaviors by calling explicit attention to task 
demands. 
Suggestion 4: Empirically investigate the relationship among different 
outcome measures. One consequence of the small amount of work that 
has gone into identifying alternative outcome measures is that very 
little is known about the relationship among these measures. For 
example, there has not been a systematic comparison of the relation-
ship between ratings of monitoring accuracy and self-reported strat-
egies, even though these measures are used frequently in the literature. 
As measurement experts would remind us, the more measures we use 
to assess an outcome, and the more we know about the relationship 
among these measures, the better able we are to make reliable and 
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valid inferences about the construct under study. Put simply, it is crucial 
to converge on a consh·uct using multiple, triangulated methods. 
Suggestion 5: Establish methodological and data-analytic guidelines for 
measuring metacognition. Any research tradition quickly establishes its 
own informal or formal guidelines for administering and interpreting 
a task. One example is the use of monitoring accuracy judgments that 
pervade the metacognition literature. Nevertheless, with the excep-
tion of monitoring accuracy judgments (see Tobias & Everson, this 
volume), error-detection (see Baker & Cerro, this volume), and self-
reported strategy use (see Pressley, this volume), there are few guide-
lines available for either researchers or practitioners. This is a serious 
obstacle for educators who want to improve metacognition in the 
classroom. One difficulty is understanding what metacognition is, a 
problem that is due in part to too much theoretical and terminological 
slippage. Another problem is selecting a benchmark for measuring 
the growth of metacognition (see Suggestion 3 above). A third 
problem is deciding on a method for assessing metacognitive progress. 
My observations have led me to conclude that teachers and parents 
typically assess meta cognitive growth using intuitive hunches rather 
than tangible outcome measures. This is due to at least three factors: 
(a) uncertainty about what to look for; (b) the lack of meaningful, cost-
efficient measurement strategies; and (c) the lack of meaningful 
interpretative guidelines. 
The lack of procedural and interpretative guidelines is a serious 
problem within and beyond the field of metacognition. Within the 
field, there are few established procedures for measuring metacognitive 
knowledge. Of the three most widely used paper-and-pencil instru-
ments (i.e., the LASSl, MSLQ, and MAl), only the LASSl has been 
used enough to provide relatively stable norms for different types of 
students. Most studies continue to use instruments designed specifi-
cally for the study at hand. Many studies that used the LASSl, MSLQ, 
or MAl also have fairly small sample sizes (i.e., less than 100), that 
preclude a meaningful replication of previous studies. To complicate 
matters, very few studies ever report reliability coefficients for crite-
rion measures, and few researchers have enough measurement and 
statistical savvy to understand the subtle, yet important, differences 
among alternative data-analytic strategies once data have been col-
lected (Keren, 1991; Schraw, 1995). 
Another issue concerns the purpose of metacognitive assessment 
(Baker & Cerro, this volume). Information gathered during an assess-
ment can be used for different purposes (Tindal & Marston, 1990). 
One purpose is to make placement decisions, such as whether a 
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student is admitted to a restricted program. A second purpose is to 
make diagnostic judgments regarding a specific skill or learning 
disability. A third purpose is to use the information to provide 
ongoing feedback to students, parents, and teachers. A fourth pur-
pose is to provide summative evaluation at the end of an instructional 
unit or training session. Whereas most researchers used measures of 
metacognition as summative indices of unobservable metacognitive 
competencies, most educators are interested in metacognition from a 
diagnostic and formative evaluation perspective. There has been very 
little thought given to bridging the gap between researchers and 
theorists on the one hand, and practitioners on the other. I believe 
researchers have a responsibility to bridge this gap and to address 
how educators can collect information about a student's skills in a 
manner that enables the educator to provide useful formative feed-
back. Similarly, many teachers hunger for guidelines for diagnosing 
potential learning difficulties related to lack of cognitive and 
metacognitive regulation. 
Suggestion 6: Establish guidelines for implementing and evaluating 
instruction. Metacognitive theory has not been translated adequately 
into educational practice. This sentiment was captured well by Baker 
(1989), Garner (1987), and Baker and Cerro (this volume). Few 
teachers have a clear sense of how to improve metacognition and 
meta memory, or even ways to enhance the growth of specific sub-
components of metacognition such as conditional knowledge, al-
though some educators are quite skilled in this regard. Educators 
desire guidelines for helping their students become more 
metacognitively aware. These guidelines should explicate separate 
subcomponents of metacognition (e.g., conditional knowledge, moni-
toring) as specifically as possible, and propose specific instructional 
interventions that improve these skills. Researchers also must pro-
pose guidelines for assessing the growth of metacognitive skills. 
A number of researchers have investigated the kind of instruc-
tional interventions I am describing (Brown & Pressley, 1994; Delclos 
& Harrington, 1991; King, 1991; Paris & Jacobs, 1987; Palincsar & 
Brown, 1989; Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1990). Many of these 
interventions have focused on teaching specific strategies (e.g., iden-
tifying main ideas) and monitoring their use. Others have proposed 
a broader research agenda (Garner, 1990; Pressley, Harris, & Marks, 
1992; Van Meter, Yokoi, & Pressley, 1994). My own view is that 
instructional research in metacognition should proceed in several 
ways. One is the traditional theory-driven approach reflected in the 
work of Palincsar and Brown (1984). Another avenue is to utilize in-
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class observations to construct grounded theories of metacognition 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Pressley, this volume). Grounded theories 
seem especially important at this juncture given the lack of a unified 
theory of metacognition. A third approach is to utilize phenomeno-
logical methods (Creswell, 1994; Moustakas, 1994) that provide an in-
depth descriptive accolmt of what effective teachers do to improve 
metacognition. 
Educators need to assess the effectiveness of their interventions as 
well. As I have suggested at several points in this chapter, guidelines 
and proven instruments for doing so are lacking. There is much that 
teacher-preparation programs could do to enhance future educators' 
knowledge of measurement and assessment. However, at present, 
many preservice teachers appear to be ill-prepared to meet assess-
ment challenges. At a minimum, classes in reading, science, and 
mathematics instruction should include methods for providing a 
knowledge base, as well as metacognitive knowledge about regulat-
ing that knowledge base. Suggestions for assessing the effectiveness 
of both kinds of instruction (i.e., cognitive and metacognitive skills) 
should be embedded within this context. 
Suggestion 7: Consider the relationship among metacognitive and 
affective variables. This suggestion follows from the work of Borkowski 
and colleagues (Borkowski . & Muthukrishna, 1992; Borkowski, 
Millstead, & Hale, 1988; Borkowski et al., this volume) that describes 
the relationship among metacognitive and affective variables. Far less 
has been made of these important connections than they deserve (see 
Weinert,1987). However, several studies suggest that metacognition 
may playa role in increasing personal interest and reducing anxiety 
that interferes with task performance (Tobias, 1995; Tobias & Everson, 
this volume). Similarly, metacognition may facilitate the understand-
ing and regulation of emotions and possible selves in academic 
settings (Borkowski & Thorpe, 1994). Last, Pintrich and colleagues 
(Garcia & Pintrich, 1994; Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990; Pintrich et al., this 
volume) have elaborated on a number of important connections 
between metacognition and motivation. 
Summary 
This section ha s proposed a broad agenda for translating 
metacognitive theory into educational practice on a broad scale. This 
goal is ambitious. It will take the better part of a decade under the 
bes t of circumstances. The success of this research depends in large 
part on the ability of theorists, insh'uctional design experts, and 
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specialists in educational measurement to carve out a common agenda. 
This agenda should accomplish the following: (a) provide operational 
definitions of specific metacognitive skills and their relationship to the 
student's knowledge base, (b) construct and evaluate a variety of 
outcome measures that can be used to assess these skills, (c) cross-
validate these outcome measures so that they can be used collectively to 
conduct multidimensional assessment of metacognitive skills, and (d) 
train practicing teachers to teach and evaluate metacognitive skills. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to provide an overview of salient 
measurement issues that are relevant to the study of metacognition. 
Although I believe the construct of metacognition is essential to 
understanding human cognition, the past two decades of research 
and practice have not achieved the lofty goal of presenting a compre-
hensive theory of metacognition that can be rendered into educational 
practice. It is time to take this goal seriously. The Buros Symposium 
on Issues in the Measurement of Metacognition was convened for this 
specific purpose. The chapters included in this volume have turned 
over many rocks, showing us the good, the bad, and the ugly. 
Yet although a call to arms is warranted, it would be misleading 
to suggest that the field has reached an impasse. As evidenced by the 
chapters in this book, researchers agree on many essential points 
regarding metacognitive theory and practice. There is substantial 
agreement that the related constructs of metacognition and self-
regulation have made an enormous contribution to cognitive psy-
chology, literally changing the way that psychologists and educators 
view cognition and development. There also is widespread agree-
ment that it is time to shore-up our knowledge of metacognition with 
sound measurement practice. 
The separate and combined contributions of this volume point us 
in the right direction for substantial progress over the next decade. 
Metacognition has much to offer teachers and researchers. I believe 
the field of metacognition can deliver on its promise of helping 
students at all levels understand their thinking and learning. 
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